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I. Introduction
1. In his letter dated 25 April 2001 (S/2001/408),
the President of the Security Council informed the
Secretary-General that the members of the Council had
decided to send a mission to the Great Lakes region of
Africa. Following consultations among the members, it
was agreed that the composition of the mission should
be as follows:
France (Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, Head of
Mission)
China (Ambassador Wang Yingfan)
Colombia (Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso)
Ireland (Ambassador David Cooney)
Jamaica (Ambassador Curtis A. Ward)
Mali (Ambassador Moctar Ouane)
Mauritius (Ambassador Anund Priyay Neewoor)
Singapore (Ambassador Kishore Mahbubani)
Tunisia (Ambassador Othman Jerandi)
Ukraine (Ambassador Valery P. Kuchinsky)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland (Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock)
United States of America (Ambassador Cameron
R. Hume).
2. The terms of reference of the mission are annexed
to document S/2001/408.
3. The Security Council mission left New York on 15
May and returned on 26 May. During that period, the
mission visited Johannesburg, Pretoria, Kinshasa, Luanda,
Lusaka, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Kigali and Kampala.
They met with the President of South Africa, Thabo
Mbeki; the President of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Joseph Kabila; the President of Angola, José
Eduardo dos Santos; the President of Namibia, Sam
Nujoma; the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe; the
President of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba; the President of
Burundi, Pierre Buyoya; the President of the United
Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa; the President of
Rwanda, Paul Kagame; and the President of Uganda,
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, as well as the facilitator in the
Burundi conflict, former President Nelson Mandela, and
the neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue,
former President Sir Ketumile Masire. The mission also
met with the Political Committee in Lusaka, and the
leader of the Front de libération du Congo (FLC), Jean-
Pierre Bemba, and held informal talks with leaders of the
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD
(Goma)) and leaders of the Burundian Front pour la
défense de la démocratie (FDD) and the Forces nationales
pour la libération (FNL). The mission met with Congolese
members of civil society, religious leaders and
representatives of political parties. In Rwanda, members
met with Government Ministers and representatives of
civil society, and in Burundi with signatories of the
Arusha Agreement. The mission visited Mbandaka,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, on 20 May.
II. Activities of the Security Council
mission
4. With each of its interlocutors, the leader of the
Security Council mission, Ambassador Levitte,
introduced the members of the mission and set out its
objectives, in accordance with the terms of reference.
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Individual members then made comments or put
questions. The Security Council mission conducted the
following meetings and activities during its visit.
Meeting with Sir Ketumile Masire
5. The Security Council mission met with the
neutral facilitator in the inter-Congolese dialogue, Sir
Ketumile Masire, in Johannesburg on 17 May. In a
detailed exchange of views, Sir Ketumile informed the
mission of his plans to advance the dialogue and
outlined some of the difficulties he foresaw in its
progress. Members of the mission stressed the need to
ensure that progress in the political sphere of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, notably the dialogue, was
made in parallel with the military aspects, namely, the
withdrawal of foreign forces and the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement of armed groups.
6. Sir Ketumile informed the mission that, in the
coming weeks, he would dispatch two senior advisers,
Archibald Mogwe and Hacen Ould Lebatt, to meet with
members of civil society and the unarmed opposition in
all 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and to supervise the designation of their
representatives in accordance with article 6 of the
Declaration of Principles of 4 May 2001. It would also
be necessary to resolve other questions, including the
timing, location and agenda of the dialogue, as well as
substantive issues such as the organization and conduct
of elections, the drafting of a constitution, the creation
of institutions to support good governance and the
formation of a new national army. The facilitator had
requested the parties to provide him with their views
on these matters by mid-May, but none had so far done
so. The facilitator was now strengthening his office in
Kinshasa, which is headed by Mr. Ould Lebatt, with the
assistance of the United Nations Organization Mission
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
Sir Ketumile, who had envisaged convening a
preparatory conference towards the end of June or
early in July, announced at a subsequent meeting with
the mission in Lusaka on 22 May that the preparatory
conference would begin on 16 July.
7. Sir Ketumile also thought it necessary to include
in the dialogue the humanitarian situation, the economy
and development, despite the reservations expressed by
some donors. The nature, modalities of establishment
and powers of the transitional administration to be
established in accordance with the dialogue also
remained to be decided upon, though Sir Ketumile
agreed with members of the mission that its duration
should be as brief as possible.
8. No decision had emerged as to the location of the
dialogue. Mutual distrust among the parties might
preclude convening it in Kinshasa, although the
possibility of conducting the dialogue within the
Democratic Republic of the Congo had not been ruled
out. External locations such as Addis Ababa and
Lusaka had also been suggested. Sir Ketumile
confirmed that he had no objection to any location for
the dialogue within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, so long as it was agreeable to the parties.
9. Members agreed that the inter-Congolese
dialogue was the centrepiece of the entire peace
process. They had found Sir Ketumile Masire’s briefing
very encouraging. Members also looked forward to the
full cooperation of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo with the facilitator.
Meeting with Nelson Mandela
10. The Security Council mission met with the
facilitator of the Burundi peace process, former
President Nelson Mandela, in Johannesburg on 17 May.
The members of the mission sought Mr. Mandela’s
guidance on the approach the Council mission should
take with President Buyoya; whether to meet with the
rebel groups, if that were possible, and how to engage
them; and how regional leaders could be invited to
assist. In particular the facilitator’s views were sought
on the advantages of establishing a permanent
negotiating mechanism to devote sustained attention to
the problem.
11. Mr. Mandela, stressing that he took an optimistic
view, briefly recounted the events surrounding and
since the signing of the Arusha Agreement on Peace
and Reconciliation on 28 August 2000. The facilitator
identified two central issues: the transitional
Government and the ceasefire. Mr. Mandela advised
the Security Council mission to make it very clear to
the armed groups that there was no military solution,
and that dialogue was the sole means of reaching
agreement.
12. Members of the mission noted that many of the
reports received by the Council concerning the
situation in Burundi had been very pessimistic. It was
noted that, in a disturbing development, the numbers of
the armed groups had grown recently, and they
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appeared to be concentrating around Bujumbura. The
facilitator also spoke of the negative attitude towards
the United Republic of Tanzania now current within
Burundi.
Meeting with President Mbeki
13. The Security Council mission met with President
Mbeki in Pretoria on 17 May. Identifying the need to
disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia as the key
to an eventual Rwandan pull-out, President Mbeki said
there were indications that Rwanda might be prepared
to offer amnesty to those armed group members who
were not wanted by the Tribunal.
14. The Burundian FDD were reportedly regrouping
in the United Republic of Tanzania, apparently under
the pressure of the ongoing peace process in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This might oblige
the United Republic of Tanzania to place more troops
at the border. The Vice-President of South Africa,
Jacob Zuma, was conducting talks with the President of
Gabon, Omar Bongo, President Kabila, the Burundians
and others, and the bilateral talks between the
Burundian rebels and President Kabila, and between
President Kabila and President Kagame, were a
welcome development.
15. In the political process, President Mbeki saw no
problems of principle, only of detail. The neutral
facilitator would need more resources to carry out his
functions. President Kabila appeared to be sincere in
his commitment to the peace process, and the recent
meeting between President Kagame and President
Mugabe in Harare was a positive development.
Meeting with President Kabila
16. The Security Council mission met with President
Kabila and some of his senior officials, including the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Leonard She Okitundu, in
Kinshasa on 18 May. A key issue raised by members of
the mission was the demilitarization of Kisangani
pursuant to resolution 1304 (2000). The Council
mission also looked forward to discussing with the
Political Committee its plans for the withdrawal of
foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement of armed groups. With reference to the
need to gather information on the armed groups who
were to undergo disarmament and demobilization, it
would be helpful if the Government could provide all
possible data to the Joint Military Commission and to
MONUC. In this connection, the mission stressed that
the establishment and maintenance of productive
bilateral channels between Kinshasa and Kigali were
vital to the restoration of peace and the development of
democracy and prosperity in the subregion. This was
the key to the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
and repatriation or resettlement of armed groups, since
the United Nations would not be in a position to track
them down and disarm them by force.
17. The question of the civil administration of the
zones to be evacuated by foreign forces was a matter of
concern to the Security Council, in the context of
protecting the civilian population, as well as the
possibility of the establishment of an interim
administration to maintain law and order.
18. There was an important economic element in the
involvement of the international community in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, pointed out
members of the mission. MONUC could play a role in
reviving the country’s economy by helping to reopen
the riverine system. The head of the mission was
pleased to announce that the Uruguayan riverine unit
was scheduled to arrive in the country on 6 June, and
would be based at Mbandaka. Work was also needed to
restore the railways and to implement quick-impact
projects. Finally, support had been expressed for the
convening at the appropriate time of a regional
conference on the Great Lakes region.
19. In his response, President Kabila placed great
emphasis on his Government’s view that the Rwandan
and Ugandan troops in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo were forces of aggression — not “uninvited
forces” — and that, in accordance with resolution 1304
(2000), they should withdraw forthwith. The Congolese
people had never accepted those forces, and their
resistance continued. Referring to the Mayi-Mayi
fighters, President Kabila said they should not be
regarded as “negative forces”. Allied troops would also
be expected to withdraw in due course. His
Government fully supported the inter-Congolese
dialogue. The dialogue was a matter for the Congolese
people, however, and could not be conducted in the
presence of foreign armies. It was against that
background that he had repealed decree 194, thus
liberalizing the political climate in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
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20. President Kabila agreed with remarks by
members of the mission on the importance of direct
contact with Rwanda, the “disastrous” humanitarian
situation, the risks of the conflict in Burundi, the
difficulties posed by the disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation or resettlement exercise
and the need for full respect for human rights.
Supplementing the President’s observations, Foreign
Minister She Okitundu said the Government had
demonstrated its flexibility and its willingness to
engage in dialogue. All the questions raised by the
mission could be dealt with in the context of the
dialogue. An international conference could be a good
way of focusing further attention on the problems of
the region.
21. In the view of President Kabila, the Government
should take over the civil administration throughout the
country as and when foreign forces withdrew. President
Kabila added that FLC and RCD did not represent the
Congolese people. It might be necessary to hold
elections to determine who should represent the people
in the inter-Congolese dialogue. Perhaps the United
Nations could organize those elections.
22. Agreeing with the remark that he had opened up a
window of opportunity, President Kabila added “I
could not close it even if I wanted to. I want to break
down walls as well”.
23. In response to a question, President Kabila
confirmed that his Government had instituted a
demobilization programme for children under the age
of 18. The four child soldiers who had been sentenced
to death in 1999 had had their sentences commuted,
and other measures were being examined by the
Government. Not enough had been done to publicize
this situation, the President acknowledged.
24. Offering to engage in dialogue with anyone,
President Kabila reiterated his support for the Lusaka
Agreement, calling it “our Bible”. Those who had
seized power through the barrel of a gun did not
represent the people. He had no intention of retaining
power for its own sake, but wished to give the
Congolese people the right to decide their own future.
If they did not get that chance now, they might have to
wait another 40 or 50 years, said President Kabila. He
wanted to see elections in his lifetime — preferably
within the year.
Meeting with specialized agencies
25. The Security Council mission met with
representatives of the specialized agencies based in
Kinshasa for a wide-ranging discussion of issues
relating to the competence and activities of each
agency, and the future roles they might play in the
event of an expansion in the mandate of MONUC.
Meeting with President dos Santos
26. The Security Council mission met with President
dos Santos in Luanda on 18 May, before returning the
same evening to Kinshasa.
27. The members of the mission condemned the
attack by UNITA at Caxito, Angola, where 200 people
had been killed and more than 60 children had been
abducted. The Security Council, he continued, was
determined to implement in full all resolutions
pertaining to sanctions against UNITA, and was
making steady progress in doing so. President dos
Santos expressed particular appreciation for the
mission’s reference to the UNITA attack on Caxito,
which he accepted as a message of solidarity with the
victims.
28. There now existed a set of factors that would
facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement,
said the Angolan Head of State. President Kabila was
flexible and, with Angolan encouragement, had taken
significant steps towards conducting the inter-
Congolese dialogue. The two aspects of the accord —
its military provisions and the dialogue — should be
conducted in parallel. It was important to establish a
timetable for both aspects.
29. While the main issue was to end the war, said the
President, consideration should also be given to the
role of the Government during the transitional period.
The size of the country, the multiplicity of actors and
the complexity of the situation could give rise to
dangers if it was envisaged to create a new authority to
govern during the transitional period. It would be
preferable to work with the present Government and to
persuade it to comply with rules to be developed within
the context of the dialogue until general elections could
be held with the participation of all parties.
30. To a question concerning the timing of various
aspects of the implementation of the Lusaka
Agreement, President dos Santos replied that only after
political agreement had been reached could full
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military withdrawal take place. Awaiting a political
resolution would take longer, but would be safer; it was
the dialogue that should be speeded up. President dos
Santos stressed the need for the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to establish a national army to control
illegal arms traffic.
31. President dos Santos agreed that there was an
area of dispute in the text of the Lusaka Agreement as
to the extent of the authority of the Government
throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo during the transitional period. In his view,
the rebel groups should take part in the definition of
rules, which would provide a guarantee that they could
attain political power through elections. That did not
necessarily imply, however, that they would win a
place in the Government. That had not been the case in
Mozambique or in Angola, where they had been
admitted only after the elections.
Meeting with President Nujoma
32. The Security Council mission met with President
Nujoma and some of his senior officials in Kinshasa on
19 May. The Namibian Head of State had come to the
Congolese capital to participate in a summit meeting of
allies.
33. President Nujoma stressed that his country’s
forces and those of the other members of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) allied with
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo had been invited by the legitimate Government
of the country in order to prevent “chaos”. He drew a
sharp distinction between the allies and the “aggressor”
forces of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, calling on the
Security Council to apply sanctions against those
countries. The aggressors had armed and encouraged
Congolese rebels, “who had killed two and a half
million people” without any objection from the
Security Council.
34. In response, members of the Security Council
mission recalled that the Lusaka Agreement made no
distinction between “invited” and “uninvited” forces.
That distinction had, however, been made clear in
Security Council resolutions. The Council had indeed
taken action in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
MONUC was deploying more than 2,000 troops and
military observers as the parties completed the
disengagement of their forces from the confrontation
line. More would be sent if the parties continued to
carry out their plans.
Meeting with President Mugabe
35. The Security Council mission met with President
Mugabe in Kinshasa on 19 May. The Zimbabwean
Head of State had come to the Congolese capital to
participate in a summit meeting of allies. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Stanislaus I. G. Mudenge, also
attended the meeting. The questions raised included
when and through what modalities Zimbabwean troops
would be withdrawn; President Mugabe’s recent
meeting with President Kagame in Harare; the possible
retention by some of the signatories of the military
option; and the cooperation of the Government of
Zimbabwe with the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
36. President Mugabe said that Zimbabwean troops
would withdraw in accordance with the same principles
that had required their original deployment, and after
their original goals had been met. It would also be
necessary to ensure, perhaps through the institution of
mechanisms under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, that there was no risk of the return of
Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian troops. To do
otherwise would be “foolish”, and would raise the
question why Zimbabwean troops had been committed
in the first place. Zimbabwe would perform all acts
required of it under the Lusaka Agreement, said the
President, “but the invaders must go first, and we must
be sure they are out before our last man leaves”. All the
forces had now disengaged, except for those of FLC.
The Zimbabwean Head of State expressed willingness
to work with Rwanda in this effort.
37. President Mugabe informed the Council mission
that President Kagame had come to see him to discuss
progress in the peace process, particularly with
reference to the armed groups. Though President
Kagame had claimed to have seen no progress in that
direction, it had in fact been considerable, continued
President Mugabe. Zimbabwean forces had identified
and “processed” quite a number of them. President
Kagame had told President Mugabe that he would now
use this information in making his plans.
38. Turning to the Panel of Experts, President
Mugabe stated that they had asked him no direct
questions during their visit to Zimbabwe. Since its
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entry into the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo had exhausted its resources, Zimbabwe had
asked the Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo to bear the costs. Being unable to do so,
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila had suggested a
partnership to develop the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, sharing the profits
equally. In the event, however, the diamond mine
offered to his Government had yielded nothing
significant. His Government would be happy to provide
details, since Zimbabwe had nothing to hide.
Meeting with Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye
39. While in Kinshasa, the Security Council mission
met with Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, the leader of
the Front pour la défense de la démocratie, an armed
group that had not participated in the peace process
facilitated by Mr. Mandela.
40. During the meeting, Mr. Ndayikengurukiye
handed the members of the mission a memorandum
explaining why FDD rejected the Arusha process, and
setting out steps that the international community had
to take to help resolve the conflict in Burundi. In the
view of FDD, democrats were engaged in a struggle
against a military dictatorship that had been in power
since 1966. The country’s first democratically elected
Head of State, President Melchior Ndadaye, had been
assassinated, and the constitution of 1992 violated.
FDD believed that any resolution of the conflict should
be based on the 1992 constitution and should lead to
the formation of a new army in accordance with and
subject to that constitution.
41. Mr. Ndayikengurukiye said that FDD rejected the
Arusha peace process primarily because it called for an
immediate ceasefire before addressing the reasons
behind the armed struggle. At the same time, he
reiterated that FDD was ready to negotiate with the
army to restore peace in Burundi. FDD wanted
President Bongo to be appointed as co-facilitator to
work together with former President Mandela. FDD
further requested the dismantlement of camps, the
immediate liberation of political prisoners, and the
establishment of a human rights commission.
42. Mr. Ndayikengurukiye then suggested a four-
phase peace plan involving the formation of new
security and defence forces; an end to hostile media
campaigns; negotiation of the modalities of
implementation of the framework agreement; and a
ceasefire agreement. The Government would establish
a criminal tribunal, form new national security and
defence forces, organize the return of refugees,
reorganize the national administration and organize
elections.
43. All members of the mission then presented to the
FDD leader a very clear and strong message: there was
no prospect of military victory in the Burundi conflict;
the only way to resolve it was through peaceful
negotiations; any party which came to power through
the use of force could expect nothing but rejection
from the international community; while, by contrast,
all those who engaged in negotiations towards a
peaceful settlement could expect international support,
including the $400 million pledged by donors at the
Paris conference in December 2000.
44. On the issue of the possible involvement of
President Bongo as co-facilitator, the members of the
mission invited Mr. Ndayikengurukiye to discuss this
matter with Mr. Mandela if he thought it would be
helpful. The Representative of the Secretary-General in
Burundi, Jean Arnault, who was present at the meeting,
enjoyed the full confidence of the Security Council and
was ready to assist. The Council was prepared to
discuss other forms of assistance, such as strengthening
the facilitator’s office, establishing a verification
commission and perhaps considering the creation of a
tribunal. However, unlike FDD, members insisted that
a ceasefire should be first on the list of priorities, not
last.
45. In response to what he called this “unambiguous”
message from the Council mission, Mr. Ndayikengurukiye
stated that he had never envisaged a military solution
to the problems of Burundi. He explained that
resistance to the army was essentially spontaneous on
the part of the people, and that it had only recently
taken on an organized form. He stressed the need for a
coherent approach to resolving the conflict in his
country.
Meetings with Congolese civil society, religious
groups and political parties
46. On 20 May the members of the Security Council
mission met with representatives in Kinshasa of civil
society, religious groups and political parties. The
meetings were thus held immediately following
President Kabila’s announcement on the day of the
arrival of the Security Council mission in Kinshasa, 17
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May, of the Government’s intention to promote
dialogue between all Congolese aimed at national
reconciliation. The President had stated that that
objective could be achieved only if the representatives
of the people from different provinces played a real
part in that forum, which must not be the concern of
politicians alone.
47. In his statement, President Kabila had also
announced the promulgation of a law on the
organization and functioning of political parties,
effectively repealing decree 194, which restricted
political party activities. Other measures announced
included a partial amnesty and steps to improve the
economy.
48. The main points of view that emerged from the
discussions between the Security Council mission and
the Congolese participants included the urgent need of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for international
assistance, including considerably augmented
assistance from the United Nations; their insistence on
a democratic political structure for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, without privilege for those who
had resorted to armed force; support for the Lusaka
Agreement and the inter-Congolese dialogue, which
should take place, if possible, in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo; the need for the completion of
phase II and the further deployment of MONUC for
phase III; deep concern at the illegal exploitation of the
country’s natural resources and the role being played in
that exploitation by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi;
serious human rights violations throughout the country,
particularly those directed against members of the
unarmed opposition, the clergy, women and children,
and those resisting foreign occupation; the need to
disarm, demobilize, reintegrate and resettle the armed
groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement;
humanitarian concerns; and the prospects for the
future.
49. Outside the hotel where the meetings were held, a
crowd of several hundred people demonstrated
peacefully, calling on President Kabila to resign and
voicing support for political parties and for democracy.
Visit to Mbandaka
50. On 20 May, the mission visited sector 1
headquarters at Mbandaka, in Équateur Province, the
deployment location of the 280-strong Senegalese
guard unit and the future site of the Uruguayan riverine
unit. The mission was informed that a total of seven
verification and monitoring teams were to be
established in sector 1, at Gemena, Gbadolite,
Makanza, Basankusu, Bolombo and Befale. Since
sector 1 was the last of the four sectors to receive
deployment, verification began only on 10 May.
Consequently, verification had been completed at only
one of the 10 sites to be verified.
51. The head of the mission took the opportunity of
the mission’s visit to Mbandaka to announce officially
the reopening of the River Congo from Kinshasa to
Kisangani. Declaring, to applause, that it was time to
build peace, he stated that the forthcoming deployment
of the MONUC riverine units would stimulate an
economic renaissance in the country. Calling on all
parties to disengage in accordance with the Harare
plan, the head of the mission added that no ceasefire
violations would be tolerated.
Meeting with the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
52. Shortly before leaving Kinshasa, on 21 May, the
Security Council mission met again with Government
Ministers to discuss a range of issues related to the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
released a statement to the press on its visit (see
addendum to the present report).
Meeting with President Chiluba
53. The Security Council mission met with President
Chiluba in Lusaka on 22 May. While noting
“encouraging” progress in many areas, the Zambian
Head of State invited the Security Council to increase
the size of the peacekeeping force when it considered
the renewal of the mandate of MONUC in June.
President Chiluba attributed to the Security Council the
fact that the countries of the region had now gathered
sufficient political will to advance the peace process.
54. Members of the mission stressed their deep
appreciation of the role played by President Chiluba in
supporting the peace process, and stressed their own
conviction that the Lusaka Agreement was the only
framework within which peace could be restored to the
region. It was agreed that all foreign forces should




Meeting with the Political Committee
55. The Security Council mission spent the afternoon
of 22 May with the Political Committee discussing in
great detail the questions of the withdrawal of all
foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement of the armed groups identified in the
annex to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
56. Five main topics were considered at the meeting,
namely, the completion of the disengagement exercise;
the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and
repatriation or resettlement of armed groups; the
co-location of the Joint Military Commission with
MONUC; and the demilitarization of Kisangani.
57. At the outset of the meeting, which was opened
by President Chiluba, it was announced that FLC had
committed itself to disengaging its forces from their
present positions in accordance with the disengagement
plan by 1 June, and that MONUC military observers
would deploy in Équateur Province during the coming
week. Supplementing that announcement, the
Chairman of the Political Committee, Minister Patrick
Mazimhaka (Rwanda), said it would soon be possible
to enter phase III. Planning for the third phase should
therefore begin.
58. General Mwaniki, the Chairman of the Joint
Military Commission, then reported that a plan had
been drawn up for the withdrawal of foreign forces
from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (see addendum to the present report), starting
from the new defensive positions to which they had
redeployed in accordance with the disengagement plan.
After some discussion, it was confirmed that D-Day,
the starting date for the timetable, should be
22 February, the date of the adoption by the Security
Council of resolution 1341 (2001). Pursuant to the
three-phase plan, the foreign forces would complete
their withdrawal in accordance with the agreed
timetable.
59. Members of the Security Council mission insisted
that the parties should provide the necessary detailed
information concerning the numbers, locations,
assembly areas, withdrawal routes and timetables in
order to allow the United Nations to make its own
plans to assist the parties and to monitor the process.
60. Members stressed that it was necessary to
advance the peace process step by step. The
disengagement plan and the ceasefire should be strictly
observed, and parties responsible for violations should
bear the consequences. Direct dialogue between the
Heads of State concerned was particularly important,
with the objectives of national reconciliation internally,
and the reconciliation of all the countries in the region.
The Security Council would continue to keep the
situation under very close review.
61. Discussion then turned to the plan for
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and
repatriation or resettlement adopted by the Political
Committee (see addendum to the present report).
Members of the Security Council mission made it clear
that the plan should be carried out against the
background of close cooperation between President
Kabila and President Kagame. Its terms should be
strictly adhered to, and United Nations assistance
would be provided taking into consideration the level
of commitment shown by the parties in their
compliance with the plan. The first essential was for
the parties to provide the information required,
including the numbers, locations and armaments of the
various armed groups, and the proposed sites of their
demobilization areas. In that connection, the mission
expressed concern that the current level, content and
frequency of the bilateral contacts between the
Governments involved might not be sufficient to
ensure the necessary cooperation.
62. However, Foreign Minister Mudenge of
Zimbabwe assured the Security Council mission that,
by comparison with the previous year, relations
between the signatory parties, certainly at the
ministerial level, were greatly improved. A good
working environment had developed among the
members of the Political Committee.
63. Members of the Security Council mission put
several additional questions concerning the intentions
of signatories and their willingness and ability to carry
them out in accordance with the plans they had
approved. They cautioned strongly that the Security
Council expected to see steady, consistent progress and
strict adherence to all agreements and timetables. The
momentum must be maintained, and violations would
not be tolerated.
64. Members stressed that it was essential that the
parties adhere strictly to the adopted timetable and
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provide all the necessary information concerning
positions, numbers, armaments etc. To date, only
Uganda had done so in the necessary detail. On the
basis of the information to be provided, MONUC
would have to draw up plans and modalities for the
assistance the United Nations was to provide. This
could not be done before the mandate of MONUC
expired on 15 June unless the information was
available in New York on 1 June at the latest. Only
then would it be possible to use it as the basis for the
recommendations in the report of the Secretary-
General.
65. The question of the co-location of the Joint
Military Commission with MONUC was described as a
technical, rather than a political, issue. Although
objections had been expressed to Kinshasa as the site
of the co-location on the grounds of security, the
arrival there of the Tunisian contingent on 20 May had
removed that concern. Members of the mission urged
the Political Committee to approve the co-location of
the Joint Military Commission with MONUC in
Kinshasa without further delay.
66. Members of the mission then raised the matter of
the demilitarization of Kisangani, pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1304 (2000). Although Rwanda and
Uganda had both withdrawn their troops from the city
in compliance with that resolution, RCD remained
there in force. Despite the destruction caused by the
fighting, Kisangani had the potential to become a
symbol of rebirth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The current civil administration, including the
police, could remain, but the RCD troops must leave.
MONUC Moroccan troops would provide the
necessary security, and could even be reinforced.
67. The Secretary-General of RCD, Azarias Ruberwa,
strongly objected to this demand. RCD had not been
named in resolution 1304 (2000), and in any case the
Security Council had no right to order Congolese to
withdraw from Congolese territory. Moreover, RCD
had been the most compliant party so far, disengaging
all their troops without delay.
68. Members of the mission pointed out in response
that resolution 1304 (2000) was directed explicitly at
both foreign and Congolese armed forces, including
RCD. In accordance with the disengagement plan, it
was indeed justifiable to demand that Congolese
soldiers withdrew from positions on Congolese
territory. RCD had done exactly that, as Mr. Ruberwa
had just confirmed, in complying with the
disengagement plan. The RCD forces must withdraw
from Kisangani.
69. The Security Council mission warned RCD not to
mistake the strength of purpose of the Security
Council, which maintained its insistence on the
implementation of its resolutions through all
difficulties and delays. It would be better for RCD to
respond to the Security Council’s demand with
reflection rather than defiance. RCD should not protest
too much, or assume the role of accuser when they
themselves stood accused. They must comply.
70. The Security Council mission and the Political
Committee adopted a joint communiqué at the close of
the meeting (see addendum to the present report).
Meeting with RCD (Goma)
71. Following the meeting of the Political
Committee, members of the Security Council mission
met informally with the Secretary-General and other
officials of RCD (Goma) for a general exchange of
views, including on the situation in Kisangani.
Meeting with the signatories of the Arusha
Agreement
72. The Security Council mission met with the
signatories of the Arusha Agreement at Bujumbura on
24 May, stressing the Council’s determination to help
the whole region establish lasting peace and stability.
73. Speaking on behalf of a number of allied parties,
the President of INKINZO, Alphonse Rugambarara,
recalled that six parties of the G-7 had designated
Domitien Ndayizeye as their candidate for the
transitional leadership, while eight parties of the G-10
had chosen Colonel Bayaganakandi. Mr. Rugambarara
said that the signatories were still awaiting a reaction
from Mr. Mandela. Mr. Rugambarara called on the
Government of Burundi to work with the G-7 and G-10
parties so that they could jointly undertake the
negotiations with the armed groups. If the rebels
refused to negotiate, sanctions should be imposed on
them.
74. The Vice-President of the National Assembly, Mr.
Nzojibwami, noted that, under current circumstances,
the Arusha Agreement could not be implemented.
Rebels based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
were now moving to Burundi. The National Assembly
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called on the Security Council to take all possible
measures to help end the war in his country. The
Assembly requested that the mandate of MONUC be
extended to cover Burundi’s borders with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United
Republic of Tanzania in order to prevent infiltration of
rebels into Burundi.
75. Another participant, speaking on behalf of the
Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), the
Parti libéral (PL), the Parti du Peuple (PP), and the
Rassemblement du peuple burundais (RPB), said the
Government’s “undemocratic” actions had reduced its
capacity to effectively discharge its functions, and it no
longer had sufficient credibility to negotiate a ceasefire
with the rebels. On the transitional leadership issue, the
PP representative called on the facilitator and the
region to convene another summit to assess the results
of the consultations of 19 and 20 March among the
parties. He expressed the view that the Government
was using the non-return of political leaders in exile as
a pretext for not moving forward with implementation.
76. The Minister of Justice, Térence Sinunguruza,
representing the Government, said that the signing of
the Arusha Agreement had brought a sense of relief to
the Burundian people. However, the transitional
institutions outlined in the agreement depended on the
existence of a ceasefire. The Minister said the
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement was having a
negative impact on Burundi, and that Lusaka could
pose even more serious problems for Burundi in the
future if it were not implemented completely, including
with the disarmament of the armed groups. Burundian
rebels, ex-FAR, Interahamwe and other groups were
now moving from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo into Burundi. He added that it was particularly
important that the United Republic of Tanzania help
create the conditions that would permit implementation
of the Arusha Agreement.
77. The representative of the Parti pour le
redressement national (PARENA), Rémy Nkengurutse,
said that the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement was
crucial to the Arusha peace process. Only after a
ceasefire was obtained could the agreement be
implemented and transitional institutions set up. He
called on the Security Council to apply sanctions
against the rebels and to ensure that they did not
receive support from other Governments.
Meeting with President Buyoya
78. President Buyoya said that the Burundian peace
process was unusual in the sense that the Arusha
Agreement had been signed before a ceasefire
agreement had been concluded. Nevertheless, the
Government had signed the Arusha Agreement because
of immense pressure exerted by the facilitator and the
international community, and because of assurances
that a ceasefire agreement would be obtained shortly
after. However, nine months after the signing, there
was still no ceasefire and the armed groups had not
joined the process. Though a number of meetings had
been held, it was clear that FDD was not ready to
negotiate.
79. Violence had been exacerbated in recent months
as a result of progress in the Lusaka peace process, said
President Buyoya. He noted that the disengagement of
forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had
corresponded to the movement of FDD, ex-FAR and
Interahamwe rebels into Burundi. According to
President Buyoya, elements of the FAC, FDD, FNL,
Mayi-Mayi, ex-FAR, Interahamwe and ex-FAZ (Forces
armées zaïroises) were all entering Burundi, through
various routes, from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania. Some of
these elements, he asserted, were being armed by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe.
80. President Buyoya estimated that FDD currently
had about 10,000 fighters, based in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of
Tanzania, while FNL had between 3,000 and 3,500
troops, mostly based north of Uvira in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. FDD recruited the majority of
its fighters from the Tanzanian refugee camps, located
between 10 and 40 km from the Burundian border, said
the President. Over the past few months, the security
situation along the Burundian/Tanzanian frontier had
become so serious that there was now almost an “open
state of war”. The situation could even lead to the
emergence of a new regional conflict, centred on
Burundi.
81. President Buyoya said the armed groups had
chosen the military option, and must be persuaded to
negotiate. If the rebels refused, then the region should
impose sanctions against them, as promised at the
Nairobi summit in September 2000. The Security
Council should ensure that the Democratic Republic of
the Congo fulfilled its Lusaka obligations by disarming
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FDD and FNL forces based in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. President Buyoya also expressed the
view that MONUC should be extended to cover
Burundi’s borders with the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania.
82. Turning to the issue of the transitional leadership,
President Buyoya said that without a ceasefire, all
efforts to implement the Agreement would remain
precarious. He noted that there was still no consensus
among the signatories on the designation of the
transitional president and vice-president. However, the
Government was in favour of implementing all
provisions of the Agreement that were implementable
without a ceasefire and a decision on the transitional
leadership. President Buyoya said he was willing to
establish a transitional government at once, with the
involvement of all political leaders who were currently
able to participate, and other politicians could be
integrated at a later stage.
Meeting with President Mkapa
83. President Mkapa said he was encouraged by signs
of progress in the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and hoped that the positive
momentum could be sustained. The President
expressed the view that the inter-Congolese dialogue
should start as soon as possible and should be as
inclusive as possible with a view to establishing a
consensus among the Congolese on a new political
framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
He also stressed the importance of ensuring that RCD
had a place in the new political dispensation and the
new national army. The President expressed concern at
what he called the growing tendency to criticize the
“aggressors” of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and to belittle the potential dangers of the armed
groups for the security of Rwanda, Uganda and
possibly Burundi.
84. Regarding the situation in Burundi, President
Mkapa gave a brief history of the Regional Peace
Initiative, from which the Arusha peace process had
stemmed. The agreement provided a vision for a new
Burundian society. He said that the armed groups
outside the Arusha process should not be perceived
merely as negative forces. They were “military
expressions of political intent”. The issue of the
negative forces was not so simple and even some of the
Arusha signatories could be perceived as containing
“negative forces”, including the Government.
85. On the question of whether a ceasefire should
precede the transition, he expressed the view that the
establishment of a transitional government would give
hope to the Burundian population and would show that
real change was on its way. This could in turn give
impetus to the ceasefire negotiations and could provide
the region with the “moral authority” to play a more
active role in the ceasefire issue. The Buyoya
Government, however, had done nothing to promote
the start of the transition, and President Mkapa feared
that President Buyoya’s insistence on concluding a
ceasefire agreement before starting the transition would
merely prolong the process.
86. Concern was expressed that the situation in
Burundi and the impasse in the Arusha peace process
would worsen unless a new “catalyst” was found to
push the process in a positive direction. Examples of
such a potential new catalyst could include increasing
the involvement of the region, searching for new
compromises among the Burundian parties, or
improving the “chemistry” between the Burundian and
Tanzanian leaders. The Security Council was prepared
to support any viable proposals, but they had to come
from the region itself, not from the Council. The
position of the Council was to support the Arusha
process and the facilitator. There could be a role for
other actors, including perhaps President Bongo, as
long as such efforts were authorized by Mr. Mandela
and recognized as being part of a single mediation
process.
87. President Mkapa cautioned that anger towards
Burundian refugees was growing in the United
Republic of Tanzania, even among the country’s
religious leaders, and he was therefore seriously
considering sending the refugees back home. On the
issue of finding a new catalyst for the peace process, he
suggested that the Council mission raise the issue with
President Museveni and persuade him, in his capacity
as Chairman of the Regional Peace Initiative on
Burundi, to convene another regional summit as soon
as possible. Such a summit would provide the
opportunity for the region to take up the mission’s
suggestions and views.
Meeting with FNL
88. The representative of FNL, who met with the
Security Council mission at Dar es Salaam on 24 May,
said his organization sought an in-depth solution to the
crisis in Burundi and did not support the Arusha
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approach to end the conflict through power sharing.
FNL was fighting for social justice and for the respect
of human rights, and the aim of its military struggle
was not to seize power but to put pressure on the
Government and compel it to negotiate. The FNL
representative regretted that the United Nations was
not more fully involved in Burundi and that its
engagement did not go beyond supporting the efforts of
the region. The United Nations should urge President
Buyoya to be “reasonable”, accept the principles of
social justice, and open a dialogue with FNL.
Negotiations should take place on Burundian soil.
89. Members of the Security Council mission said it
was not acceptable to use force, even if the objective
was to promote social justice. The Security Council
supported the Arusha peace process and the mediation
efforts of Mr. Mandela. The political objectives of FNL
should be pursued through political means and not
military ones. In response, the FNL representative
reiterated that his organization was not responsible for
the violence in Burundi, that military struggle was not
an end in itself, that FNL was ready to negotiate with
President Buyoya, and that the United Nations should
play a greater role in urging him to do so.
Visit to the Gisozi genocide memorial site
90. Upon arrival in Kigali on 24 May, the Security
Council mission paid a brief visit to the Gisozi
genocide memorial site, where the head of the mission
laid a wreath.
Meeting with Rwandan civil society
91. The mission met with a number of civil society
organizations, including genocide survivors, women’s
groups and commercial associations. They expressed
concern about the insecurity in the region, even
warning that another genocide might be in the course
of preparation. The representative of the genocide
survivors said the international community should
consider compensation for those who had survived the
Rwandan genocide. Representatives of a private bank
based in Kigali and the umbrella group for the
Rwandan private sector complained of the allegations
made in the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and
other speakers said the report (S/2001/357) had been
written without consultation with them and contained
serious inaccuracies. They requested that compensation
be considered, or at least the right of reply.
92. Noting that this was not the purpose of the
mission’s visit, members pointed out however that the
Security Council had extended the mandate of the
Panel of Experts in order to allow it to complete its
work on the basis of fuller information. This would
involve listening to those who felt they had been
unfairly criticized in the report. Members also replied
to participants’ questions concerning the implementation
of the programme for the disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed
groups, briefing them on the mission’s meeting with
the Political Committee in Lusaka on 22 May.
93. Representatives of a women’s group said the
peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
should be harmonized with the Burundi process on the
basis of the Arusha Agreement. They also expressed
appreciation for the adoption by the Council of
resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of women in peace
negotiations, but hoped that this would be followed up
in specific ways.
Meeting with Rwandan Government Ministers
94. Immediately after the meeting with Rwandan
civil society, the Security Council mission met with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, André Bumaya, and other
Government Ministers to discuss a range of matters
connected with the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Ministers made it clear that the
Government of Rwanda insisted on the full
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and
repatriation or resettlement of armed groups and
substantial progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue
before withdrawing their forces from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
95. Minister Mazimhaka, the Special Envoy in the
Office of the President, and currently Chairman of the
Political Committee, noted that the Government of
Rwanda was still prepared to work with the allied
Governments despite their statement to the press on 19
May accusing Rwanda of genocide in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the release by
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo of a report of a commission of inquiry blaming
Rwanda and Uganda in the assassination of President
Laurent-Désiré Kabila. The Minister also expressed
doubt that outside aid to the armed groups had ceased,
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as called for by the Council in resolution 1304 (2000).
Members of the mission assured Minister Mazimhaka
that the Security Council mission would arrive at its
conclusions independently of statements made by the
allied Presidents, or in the report of the commission of
inquiry of the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
Meeting with President Kagame
96. The Security Council mission then met with
President Kagame for further discussion of the items
raised with the Ministers, and of the report of the Panel
of Experts.
97. President Kagame identified three elements of the
next phase of the peace process in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo: disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed
groups, the inter-Congolese dialogue, and the
withdrawal of foreign forces, in that order. Though
some progress had been made, the Rwandan Head of
State was concerned at the new distinction that had
arisen between “invited” and “uninvited” forces, or
“aggressors” who might be subjected to sanctions. It
was necessary for all foreign forces to withdraw from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, said the
President.
98. Rwandan troops were in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, continued President Kagame, because of
his Government’s concern about the security of its
borders. If the Security Council could guarantee
security, he would be prepared to withdraw at once
from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Though some appeared to doubt the validity of
these security concerns, it had been underscored by the
cross-border incursions of the past few days, which the
Rwandan army had dealt with “quite adequately”, said
the President. He also expressed concern that some
actors were taking advantage of the peace process to
push fighters eastwards from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo towards Rwanda and Burundi. Though
the coming to power of President Joseph Kabila had
certainly improved the situation, it was not enough. In
response to a question, President Kagame stressed that
the maintenance of good relations between the Head of
State of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda was necessary, but was not in itself sufficient
to lead to a resolution of the conflict. Other actors,
including members of the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and other Heads of
State, were also part of the equation.
99. It was noted that, in their meetings with the
Security Council mission, even the allies of the
Government had acknowledged Rwanda’s legitimate
security concerns, asked if the Government of Rwanda
was pursuing its own enquiries into the allegations
made by the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation
of natural resources. President Kagame replied that his
Government’s internal procedures were following up
the allegations, but said that there might be a need for
more vigilance. Rwandan citizens were however asking
why they had been wronged by the Panel’s report. The
President also questioned why the members of the
Panel had concentrated only on one side in the conflict,
to the point where they had even omitted from the
report material they had been given concerning
activities on the other side. The report was deeply
flawed, said President Kagame, who asked the Security
Council to treat the matter fairly.
100. The Security Council mission assured President
Kagame that the Security Council attached the greatest
importance to the security of Rwanda. There could be
no peace in the Great Lakes region unless there was
peace in Rwanda.
Meeting with Jean-Pierre Bemba
101. The Security Council mission met with the leader
of FLC. Jean-Pierre Bemba, in Kampala on 25 May.
Mr. Bemba stressed his organization’s commitment to
the Lusaka Agreement, saying that FLC and other rebel
movements had played a critical role in “forcing” the
late President Kabila to sign the Agreement. FLC
welcomed President Joseph Kabila’s readiness to move
ahead with the inter-Congolese dialogue and to resume
the cooperation of the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo with the neutral facilitator. FLC
was ready to do its utmost to accelerate the process
leading to the dialogue.
102. Mr. Bemba added that FLC had agreed to
disengage in phases. At the same time, he requested
that the administration of the vacated areas should
remain under FLC control, as was the case for
Kisangani. Maintaining administrative control over
vacated areas was crucial to ensuring the protection of
the population, which feared for its safety as the




103. The question was however raised whether FLC
was entitled under the Harare disengagement plan to
maintain its administration in zones occupied by the
Congolese Armed Forces. Expressing their concern, the
members of the mission said the Council would react
sharply if FLC did not disengage to the agreed position
as from 1 June, as stipulated in the joint communiqué
adopted by the Security Council and the Political
Committee. The members of the mission reiterated the
Council’s readiness to deploy human rights observers
to areas vacated by FLC.
104. Mr. Bemba assured the members of the mission
that FLC would disengage as planned. He also stressed
the need for the foreign forces to withdraw as soon as
possible. With regard to the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement of armed groups in Équateur Province, he
was concerned that the Government had not provided
the necessary information regarding these groups. He
also stressed his commitment to the reopening of the
River Congo from Kinshasa to Kisangani and promised
to inquire into the killing of the ICRC workers in the
Ituri province. He criticized the report of the Panel of
Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources
for not basing its conclusions on hard evidence.
Meeting with President Museveni
105. In a review of the historical background of the
conflicts in the Great Lakes region, President Museveni
noted that the problems in the wider region had been
accumulating over the decades and were compounded
because of lack of attention by the international
community. As a result, a confrontation in one country
had had significant side effects in another. For
example, “because it had never been attended to”, the
genocide in Rwanda in 1959 had generated a flow of
Rwandan refugees to neighbouring countries (Congo,
Burundi, Uganda) and resulted in the first massacres in
Burundi in 1965.
106. While reiterating his commitment to the Lusaka
Agreement, President Museveni expressed concern at
the delay in its implementation. Hence the need to urge
President Kabila and his allies to implement it and not
to attempt to revise it. Uganda, for its part, had
respected the agreement it had signed when it decided
to withdraw from Kisangani. Perhaps, he said, the
demilitarization of the city, which was high on the
Council’s agenda, could now be achieved. President
Museveni added that Uganda intended within the next
three weeks to withdraw its forces from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the north-eastern part of the
country — with the exception of Buta, Bunia and the
Ruhenzori mountains — because it “did not want to be
responsible for the old and new mistakes” that were
being committed there. He said that most of the
remaining battalions would be withdrawn and only a
few would remain, without however providing exact
figures in that regard. Uganda’s withdrawal would not
affect its participation in the Lusaka Agreement.
President Museveni also said he had advised Mr.
Bemba to stick to the disengagement plan, and believed
that it would be possible to convince Mr. Bemba to stay
on the political path.
107. On Burundi, President Museveni recalled that
sanctions had forced President Buyoya to join the
peace process, and said that, in the same vein,
sanctions should be imposed on the rebel groups in
Burundi and on those who supported them if they
failed to adhere to the Arusha process. He said that he
was going to call for a meeting of the region to discuss
the proposal. Since the rebels’ supporters might
possibly be targeted by the sanctions, it would be
important, in that case, to also involve the United
Nations and SADC, in addition to the countries of the
region.
108. In response to remarks made by members of the
mission, President Museveni severely criticized the
Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural
resources for its conduct of its work but added however
that, despite his Government’s grievances against the
report and its authors, his Government had decided to
establish a commission of inquiry to look into its
conclusions. The Security Council mission noted this
intention.
109. On the international conference for the Great
Lakes region, President Museveni was of the view that
it should be held only once a minimum of peace had
been restored in individual countries of the region,
notably in Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and the Sudan. President Museveni
called on the Security Council to play a more active
role in the Great Lakes region. With regard to regional
efforts to move ahead with the peace process, he
believed that it would be important to avoid a
multiplicity of mediators.
110. Members of the mission reiterated the Council’s
strong commitment to ensuring full implementation of
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the Lusaka Agreement and supporting any regional
initiative to revitalize the process. It was also
highlighted that the spirit of tolerance and continued
dialogue among the various peoples, religions and
cultures of the Great Lakes region had to prevail in
order to promote a lasting peace there. Members of the
Council welcomed Uganda’s decision to establish a
commission of inquiry to look into the conclusions of
the Panel on the illegal exploitation of natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
III. Conclusions and recommendations
The situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
111. The Security Council mission found much that
was encouraging in its visit to the Great Lakes region.
For the first time since the outbreak of the conflict, the
outlines of a solution appeared to be taking shape. The
Security Council mission stresses the urgency of taking
advantage of this window of opportunity. Prominent
among these positive indications was the attitude
towards the peace process and towards MONUC of
President Joseph Kabila, who is clearly committed to
the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
and the restoration of peace and democracy to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Renewed
commitments were expressed by the other parties to the
Agreement. The Security Council mission expects the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and all parties to live up to their commitments in full,
to continue to cooperate closely with MONUC and to
discharge their responsibility for the security of United
Nations personnel.
112. The mission found that the ceasefire had
continued to hold over the past four months, and that
disengagement of the belligerents’ forces from the
confrontation line had been accomplished, pending
final verification, in three of the four military sectors.
It was also encouraging that MONUC had been able to
deploy its guard units and military observers
successfully to their designated locations.
113. The attitude of the Congolese people, as reflected
by a wide range of civil society organizations, religious
groups and opposition political parties whom the
Council mission met in Kinshasa and elsewhere,
suggests that the country is eager to move forward
towards national reconciliation, democratization and
development, with respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in a climate of political
plurality. The announcement by President Kabila, on
the day of the Security Council mission’s arrival in
Kinshasa, of the repeal of decree 194, which had
banned political parties, was a significant step towards
re-energizing the political environment and raising
hopes.
114. Nonetheless, serious obstacles remain. The
implementation of the letter and the spirit of the
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement will remain difficult in
practice as long as the sequencing of the
disengagement and withdrawal of forces is viewed
subjectively by the parties.
115. The Council mission remains concerned about the
reluctance so far of Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of
FLC, to disengage his forces, which are some 100 km
in advance of the positions they ought to be occupying
pursuant to the Harare disengagement plan. While the
announcement made at the meeting with the Political
Committee that FLC is prepared to disengage is
welcome, the Security Council must continue to
monitor the situation closely as MONUC civilian and
military observers deploy in Équateur Province.
116. The promising plans for the total withdrawal of
all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement of armed groups that have been drafted by
the Political Committee must be finalized as quickly as
possible. Detailed operational subplans must be drawn
up and signed by the military commanders of all
parties. The first requirement is for all parties that have
not already done so to submit, by early June at the
latest, the information required in the necessary detail,
to enable MONUC and the Secretary-General to
determine whether it constitutes a sufficient basis for
United Nations planning for the third phase.
117. In this connection, the mission reaffirmed the
respective obligations of the parties as specified in the
resolutions of the Security Council, including
resolution 1304 (2000), particularly that all foreign
forces must withdraw from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. This withdrawal must be conducted in a
phased and orderly manner and proceed on a mutual
and reciprocal basis according to pre-negotiated plans
accepted by all the parties.
16
S/2001/521
118. While the Council mission took a positive view
of recent developments in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, momentum could
easily be lost. The signatory parties must accept their
primary responsibility for the implementation of the
Agreement. The Security Council, as it contemplates
taking decisions that would commit significant human
and material resources, will need to judge its responses
in the light of the progress demonstrated by the parties
themselves.
119. Nevertheless, the mission is conscious that the
strong desire of the Congolese people for peace,
national reconciliation and development, which was
clearly apparent during its visit to the region, and the
relative success so far of the ceasefire, require
intensified United Nations action.
120. Accordingly, the Security Council mission
recommends that the Security Council be prepared to
consider, on the basis of specific recommendations to
be submitted by the Secretary-General in his
forthcoming report, approving a transition to phase III
of the activities of MONUC. The Council mission
understands that any recommendations the Secretary-
General might make are subject to the continuing
cooperation of the parties and their timely submission
of the necessary detailed information. During that
phase, MONUC would assist the parties in carrying out
their plans for the phased withdrawal of all foreign
forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and for the disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration and repatriation or resettlement of armed
groups.
121. The co-location of the Joint Military Commission
with MONUC would help to allow the two bodies to
coordinate military planning for the coming stages of
operations. Most of the practical difficulties, including
the provision of office accommodation and facilities,
now appear to the Council mission to have been
resolved. The arrival on 20 May, during the mission’s
visit, of the Tunisian security contingent, should
remove any further concerns about the security of JMC
members. The mission recommends that the Security
Council should call on the Political Committee to
direct the Joint Military Commission to co-locate with
MONUC in Kinshasa forthwith or, alternatively, to
show what further contribution to the process the
Commission could make in its current situation.
122. The Security Council mission left RCD and the
Political Committee in no doubt of the imperative need
to demilitarize the city of Kisangani without further
delay. The persistent presence of RCD forces in the
town, which the Council ordered demilitarized in its
resolution 1304 (2000) is a violation of that resolution.
The mission invites the Security Council to consider
further measures to promote compliance with
resolution 1304 (2000), perhaps on the
recommendation of the Secretary-General. In the
context of the demilitarization of Kisangani,
consideration of the broader role that the city could
play in the economic and political life of the country
should be envisaged.
123. The Council mission is aware of serious concerns
over the safety and security of the civilian population
in the areas to be evacuated by the withdrawal of
foreign forces. Some form of civil administration,
including a police presence, will be essential. The
mission is aware of President Kabila’s position that the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
should undertake this responsibility. Even if this
position were generally accepted, the Government
would be likely to face serious financial, organizational
and logistical problems in attempting to extend local
administration to areas formerly held by foreign forces.
These serious concerns have to be addressed by the
Congolese parties in the context of the inter-Congolese
dialogue. Subject to any decisions that may be taken
pursuant to that dialogue, the Security Council may
wish to consider any specific support measures that
might be proposed in the Secretary-General’s
forthcoming report on MONUC.
124. The disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
and repatriation or resettlement of armed groups is the
key to ending the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. Resolving the remaining problems would
remove any need for foreign troops to remain in the
east of the country, immeasurably improve the security
and quality of economic life for the area’s inhabitants,
and neutralize a dangerous source of conflict and
instability in the region. The Security Council mission
received assurances from the members of the Political
Committee that they would provide the necessary
information on the armed groups to the Joint Military
Commission in order to facilitate planning on the steps
to be taken towards a successful disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or
resettlement operation. The mission also trusts that the
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Heads of State of the region will remain in close touch
with each other on this aspect in particular. The
Security Council will take into account the timeliness
of the provision of this information, and other
indications of the commitment of the parties. The
Council may also wish, in the context of the
forthcoming report of the Secretary-General, to refine
the sanctions regime currently in force vis-à-vis the ex-
FAR and the Interahamwe.
125. If the withdrawal of all foreign forces is achieved
in accordance with the present draft plan, the
implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
would have achieved substantial completion in its
military aspects. The Security Council mission became
aware during its visits and its meetings with the Heads
of State of the region of the nuanced positions
expressed on this question. However, it was clear to the
mission that peace cannot be restored to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo until all foreign
forces have departed, and that all aspects of the peace
process should be carried out in parallel. The mission
welcomes indications that some foreign contingents
have already been withdrawn, and recommends that the
Security Council continue to urge all Governments
with foreign forces in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to withdraw them in a phased and reciprocal
process, and in accordance with their undertakings in
the Lusaka Agreement and the relevant resolutions of
the Security Council.
126. The progress made during the mission’s visit in
the preparations for the inter-Congolese dialogue is
encouraging. The Security Council may wish to
commend Sir Ketumile Masire, the neutral facilitator,
for his efforts, which will result in the convening of a
preparatory meeting on 16 July. The Security Council
may also wish to confirm that the dialogue should
proceed, in all parts of the country, as speedily as
possible, and not be delayed by any unnecessary
linkages or conditionalities connected to the military
aspects of the Lusaka process. In this context, MONUC
should be encouraged to assist the visits of
Sir Ketumile Masire’s two senior associates,
Mr. Mogwe and Mr. Ould Lebatt, to the 11 provinces of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the next
few weeks.
127. The Security Council mission is also aware that,
as outlined in the latest report of the Secretary-General
on MONUC (S/2001/373), entry into phase III will
entail a number of other activities which reach beyond
the concept of operations that MONUC has been
implementing so far. To the extent that MONUC is
expected to expand its range of tasks, it should receive
the necessary resources, equipment and personnel
accordingly, within the overall limit of 5,537 military
personnel originally approved by the Council in
resolution 1291 (2000).
128. The Security Council mission considers it
indispensable for the return to peace to be accompanied
by an increase in economic activity, which the
international community should mobilize to assist. The
mission drew attention to the list of quick-impact
projects that could be implemented where MONUC
was deployed, and encouraged the international
community and international financial institutions to
follow up with assistance. During its visit to
Mbandaka, the mission announced the reopening of the
River Congo and the imminent arrival of the MONUC
riverine unit. The restoration of river traffic will permit
the re-establishment of links between Kinshasa,
Mbandaka and Kisangani, provided all parties
cooperate.
129. MONUC can play an important role in reopening
the riverine network. Not only will the reopening of the
rivers stimulate trade, facilitate the movement of
persons and goods and thus the spread of ideas and
dialogue, it will significantly reduce the operating costs
of MONUC, which at present must transport all goods
and personnel by air at considerable expense. It will
also have very positive consequences for confidence-
building and the strengthening of a sense of national
unity. Anything that can be done to renovate the rail
and road networks of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo would have the same effect. The international
community is preparing numerous small quick-impact
projects, but should also consider broader economic
assistance to accompany the onset of peace wherever
MONUC is deployed. Other relevant organs of the
United Nations system should be made aware of the
importance of economic progress to the health of the
peace process itself. The Security Council looks
forward to receiving further details concerning the
proposed establishment of a Congo River Basin
Commission comprising the Congolese parties, United
Nations agencies and the Governments of the Republic
of the Congo and the Central African Republic under
the chairmanship of MONUC.
130. Illegitimate exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be
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brought to a halt. Those resources belong to the
Congolese people. All parties concerned should
cooperate with the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as it
continues its enquiries and completes its report. The
Security Council mission recommends that, if no
progress is made within three months, the Council
consider taking the measures necessary to put an end to
any continuing illegitimate exploitation.
131. The Security Council mission calls for full
respect for human rights by all the parties in the
Congolese tragedy, and calls for an immediate
cessation of the use of child soldiers and/or their
immediate demobilization. It recommends that the
Security Council consider, in the light of the
forthcoming report of the Secretary-General, the
deployment of additional human rights observers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. War criminals must
be held accountable. There should be no impunity, and
the Security Council should look forward to further
reports from the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón.
132. Lastly, there will be a durable peace only if all the
countries of the region succeed in defining for
themselves the rules by which to promote security and
development. At the appropriate time, an international
conference on the Great Lakes region would permit a
close and continuous examination of these questions,
as well as helping to attract donor contributions. The
Security Council should invite the leaders of the region
to consider whether the time has come to plan for such
a conference.
The situation in Burundi
133. The mission was struck by the complexity and
intractability of the situation in Burundi, and its serious
potential for large-scale violence. The Security Council
mission delivered a very strong message to all its
Burundian interlocutors: there is no military solution to
the conflict; peace can be achieved only through
negotiations within the framework of the Arusha
Agreement; all parties must be prepared to
compromise. The Security Council may wish to repeat
that message and, perhaps on the basis of further
recommendations from the Secretary-General, find
ways of making it better heard.
134. The regional Heads of State should remain
involved, and ways should be found of encouraging
dialogue between the Government and the FNL. The
strengthening of the Regional Peace Initiative, in a way
that would encourage its participants to find additional
ways of resolving the conflict, would also be desirable.
Urgent attention should be paid to the situation along
the border between the United Republic of Tanzania
and Burundi, which could ignite a serious deterioration
in the crisis. A possible way forward could be the
establishment of a joint Burundi-United Republic of
Tanzania commission on refugee issues. Following the
meeting between the Security Council mission and
FDD leaders, a new meeting, possibly in Libreville,
should be organized quickly in order to further the
dialogue between the Government and FDD.
135. The Council may wish to invite recommendations
from the Secretary-General for the strengthening of the
office of the facilitator, and for broadening the role of
the Representative of the Secretary-General. The
Security Council should also consider proposals from
the Secretary-General, in consultation with
Mr. Mandela, for the establishment of a permanent
negotiating mechanism involving the Representative of
the Secretary-General in Bujumbura. Such a
mechanism, which may require additional personnel
and resources, could deal with issues such as the
reform of the armed forces and the judiciary, human
rights and refugees and displaced persons.
136. The tragedy in Burundi is closely linked with that
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While in
Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Kigali and Kampala, the
Security Council mission became increasingly aware
that the movements of rebel fighters from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo eastwards in order
to evade being disarmed and demobilized might
aggravate the Burundi crisis. It is clear to the Security
Council mission that no action that damages Burundi
can truly assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The Security Council will continue to support a global
solution that can assist in restoring peace to both
countries, and to the entire Great Lakes region.
137. The Security Council mission wishes to express
its deep appreciation to the Heads of State of the Great
Lakes region, to Nelson Mandela and to Sir Ketumile
Masire, who met with the mission to share their views
on these many important questions. The mission is also
very grateful to the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Kamel Morjane, to MONUC and to the
Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi,
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Jean Arnault, for the sound advice and impeccable
arrangements they made for the mission’s visits to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to Burundi. The
mission thanks UNDP and other United Nations
agencies for the faultless logistical arrangements made
on its behalf in Johannesburg, Luanda, Lusaka,
Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Kigali and Kampala, and
the Secretariat staff that accompanied the mission for
their dedicated and indefatigable support.
